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Cultures of caring: healthcare ‘scandals’, inquiries, and the 
remaking of accountabilities 
 
Abstract:  
In the UK, a series of high-profile healthcare 'scandals' and subsequent inquiries repeatedly point to 
the pivotal role culture plays in producing and sustaining healthcare failures.  Most notably, the 
Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2013) which documents the 
failings at the Trust said to have contributed to the deaths of hundreds of patients between 2005 
and 2009, was overwhelmingly a comment on the culture that existed at the hospital.  More 
recently, the Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation (2015), which documents the failings in 
maternity care at Furness General Hospital, provides a stark illustration of how uncompromising 
working relationships between different professional groups, unwillingness to question taken-for-
granted practices, and zealous pursuit of professional ideology can combine to produce an 
organisational culture so dysfunctional as to culminate in the deaths of eleven babies and one 
mother.   
Increasingly the government’s response of choice to such ‘scandals’, inquiries are an emerging 
sociotechnology of accountability that signal a shift in how personal accountabilities of healthcare 
professionals are being configured.  Moreover, in focusing on problematic organisational cultures, 
these inquiries acknowledge, make visible, and seek to distribute a collective responsibility for 
healthcare failures.   
In this article, I examine how one particular inquiry – The Report of the Morecambe Bay 
Investigation (2015) – seeks to make culture visible and accountable. I question what it means to 
make culture accountable and show how the inquiry report enacts new and old forms of 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
accountability: conventional forms that position actors as individuals, where actions or decisions 
have distinct boundaries that can be isolated from the ongoing flow of care; and transformative 
forms that bring into play a remote geographical location, the role of professional ideology, as well 
as a collective cultural responsibility. 
 
Keywords:  Accountability, inquiries, culture, professional regulation  
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‘Inquiries into crimes and misdemeanours are becoming a way of life in Britain’s NHS’, says then 
editor of the British Medical Journal, Richard Smith in 2000.  This observation was made during a 
period characterised as a ‘crisis in quality’ (Bevan, 2008) as a number of high profile healthcare 
‘scandals’ were being investigated by inquiry including: paediatric heart surgery at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (2001), the incompetent practice of gynaecologist Rodney Ledward (2000), the murderous 
conduct of General Practitioner Harold Shipman (2002-5), as well as post-mortem organ retention 
practices at Alder Hey (2001).  Since then, this trend towards commissioning inquiries following 
healthcare failures has continued, with the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
(2013), and the Morecambe Bay Investigation (2015) following in quick succession.  Increasingly, it 
seems, the inquiry is the response of choice to healthcare failures.   
Inquiries can vary from small internal investigations to statutory public inquiries commissioned by 
parliament.  However, Walshe and Higgins (2002: 895) have noted a trend towards them taking the 
form of an ‘independent external investigation with full inquisitorial powers’.  The purpose of an 
inquiry, they suggest, is to retrospectively examine events to establish what occurred and what 
lessons should be learnt, however, in healthcare their scope is increasingly concerned with the 
clinical performance of healthcare professionals.  
Inquiries are often triggered by seriously troubling events: flagrant lapses in care or abuses of 
position.  However, having these circumstances recognised as such can require sustained media 
attention and well organised lobbying by patient groups (Walshe and Higgins, 2002).  Nevertheless, 
this does not explain why an inquiry should increasingly be considered the optimal tool for 
investigation and regulation.  It has been suggested, in circumstances of public discontent, that 
inquiries serve a political agenda, conveying a sense of decisive action (Greer and McLaughlin, 2016; 
Walshe and Higgins, 2002; Smith, 2000) but perhaps it also suggests dissatisfaction with traditional 
forms of regulation for healthcare professionals.   
  
4 | P a g e  
 
Indeed, Walshe and Benson (2005) suggest that public faith in professional regulation is lower than 
ever before, something they attribute to the criticism of regulatory arrangements arising from 
Bristol and Shipman inquiries.  Brown (2011) also notes how the series of failures mentioned above 
cast doubt on the medical profession’s ability to regulate itself effectively.  Professional regulation is 
often criticised for being protective of its members (Ehrich, 2006), even by doctors themselves; in 
light of Dame Janet Smith’s review of professional revalidation following the conviction of Harold 
Shipman, Dr Roger Neighbour, then President of Royal College of General Practitioners, commented 
‘The GMC’s proposals, prior to Dame Janet, much as we might wish them to have been adequate, 
were more appropriate to a golf club’s membership committee’ (2005: 241).  Consequently, Waring 
et al (2010) argue that an era of managerial control has emerged in which NHSi institutions have 
encroached upon the authority of the medical profession to regulate itself.  They identify three 
distinct causes of these regulatory changes; i) a restructuring of public services which resulted in 
market-like incentives and increased use of targets and measurement;  ii) changing public attitudes 
towards expertise and risk exemplified by the state’s management of clinical judgement in the form 
of protocols and guidelines; and (iii) public awareness of the profession’s inability to prevent or 
respond to instances of medical misconduct as indicated above.  Waring and colleagues suggest that 
this ‘new’ regulatory framework is characterised by an aim to demonstrate transparency of 
procedures, and independence from the profession and the state; aims to which inquiries also 
aspire.  
Furthermore, societal tolerance for the ‘behind closed doors’ (Rosenthal, 1995) tenor of much 
professional regulation has been diminishing.  Moran (2000:5) describes a transformation that 
occurred in UK society between 1950-2000, involving ‘the destruction of deference’ and ‘a shift from 
a population of grateful subjects to a population of demand citizens’.  Dixon-Woods et al (2011:145) 
support this societal repositioning by pointing towards the ‘remarkable increase in the ability of the 
lay public to have its demands taken seriously’ once transgressions were publicised through 
campaigning groups.  In line with these shifting relations between, patients, doctors and regulatory 
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frameworks, Smith (2000) called for inquiries to be held in public to reduce suspicions of bias, 
corruption and incompetence, and Walshe and Higgins (2002) note the growing societal and legal 
expectation of openness.  This move toward inquiries signals a shift in how professional 
accountabilities are being configured; it is a more public form of accountability, with greater external 
scrutiny and less reliance on professional self-regulation. 
In addition to changing public expectations, understanding of the nature of the problem also 
appears to have evolved over the last decade or so, in that there has been particular emphasis on 
the role ‘culture’ has played in healthcare failures.  This is most clearly exemplified by events at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Trustii.  Here, blame is laid on ‘an insidious negative culture involving a tolerance 
of poor standards and a disengagement from managerial and leadership responsibilities’ (2013: 3).  
It is a sweeping indictment of everyone from healthcare assistants, nurses and doctors, to managers 
and executive members of the Board of Governors.  The inquiry (2013:13) found that  
The culture at the Trust was not conducive to providing good care for patients or 
providing a supportive working environment for staff; there was an atmosphere of 
fear of adverse repercussions, a high priority was placed on the achievement of 
targets, the consultant body largely dissociated itself from management, there was 
low morale amongst staff, there was a lack of openness and an acceptance of poor 
standards. 
Mid Staffordshire was not the first time the culture of a hospital had been found wanting.  The 
inquiry into paediatric heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary characterised the hospital as having a 
‘club culture’ with too much power in the hands of too few individuals (2001: 2).  Moreover, the 
inquiry found the hospital’s culture was such ‘as to make open discussion and review more difficult. 
…  Those who tried to raise concerns found it hard to have their voice heard.’ (2001: 5)  
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In grappling with how ‘culture’ informs actions and responsibilities, inquiries are further reshaping 
accountabilities.  Thus far, professional regulation has struggled to accommodate a relational form 
of agency.  Instead, as Goodwin (2014: 57) has argued, frameworks of accountability are  
…premised on a model of practice that emphasises independence of thought and 
autonomy of actions, it posits decisions as discrete moments of an individual’s 
cognition, and punctuates practice with moments wherein diffuse accountabilities 
crystallise on particular actors at particular times. … Conceptualising practice in this 
way strengthens the connection between action and outcome and reflects an overly 
deterministic impression of clinical decision-making. 
Goodwin demonstrates the dependencies involved in collaborative work, how one relies on both the 
judgements and actions of others in shaping the context for one’s own thoughts and actions and 
how such entanglements are erased from view in codes of professional conduct.  Singleton (2012: 
431) makes a related point about the erasure of contexts in accountability systems used to trace 
cattle movement.  She argues,  
If the practices of being called to account are enacted as unsituated, … then they may 
be irresponsible.  By irresponsible, here I mean insensitive to and dismissive of 
embedded, embodied, and collective practices. It is in these ways that the CTS [Cattle 
Tracing System] is irresponsible even though it calls farmers to account.  It 
individualises farmers and cattle, it displaces, colonises, and replaces practices of 
responsibility.  
In light of these criticisms of conventional modes of accountability, and with respect to the growing 
emphasis placed on ‘culture’ in recent healthcare inquiries, in this article I position inquiries as a 
sociotechnology of accountability and seek to explore how they are remaking accountabilities.  To 
call an inquiry a ‘sociotechnology of accountability’ is to say that it is a set of knowledge-making 
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practices that carry assumptions, in this case about work, skills, cultures, how individuals and groups 
should and shouldn’t interact, and about the proper distribution of work between different 
professional groups.  It draws attention to a fundamental premise of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), that the social, the scientific and the technical are irredeemably bound together, and that 
through these knowledge-making practices accountabilities are configured, and inclusions and 
exclusions are created.  Although the rise of inquiries has been noted, it is a topic yet to be analysed 
through the lens of STS.  In responding to this gap in the literature, I am interested to elicit how 
‘culture’ is constituted and made visible, and in considering whether it can be made accountable in 
any meaningful way.  Research and theorising in STS has elucidated  how intensely entangled 
humans are with their material environment, with technologies, and with the thoughts, actions, 
practices of those around us, and  with this in mind I seek to examine recent shifts in how 
accountabilities are configured and distributed amongst various entities – human, non-human, 
individual, and collective.  While the context examined in this article is particular to healthcare, the 
conceptual problem – where one person claims or is made the author of collective (human and non-
human) action – plays out in many different arenas.  Prasad (2007:542) describes an analogous 
situation in the invention and patenting of MRI.  He argues that the conflict ‘arises because techno-
scientific research occurs through distributed cognition involving different actors, and a claim for an 
invention requires individualized authorship of a novel development’.  In science as in healthcare 
then, structures of authorship and accountability are built around individualised notions of cognition 
and action that are purified and idealised versions of how collaborative practices happen. 
To explore recent attempts in healthcare to account for collective responsibilities I examine The 
Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation (2015).  This inquiry (chaired by Dr Bill Kirkup CBE, and 
hence known as the ‘Kirkup Report’) investigated the high rate of maternal and neonatal deaths at 
Furness General Hospital (FGH, one of three hospitals comprising Morecambe Bay Hospitals Trust) 
and found serious failures in clinical care resulted in 11 neonatal and 1 maternal death over a period 
of 9 years.  The report examines clinical practice, responses of the Trust (internal investigations), and 
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external investigations.  In this article, however, I restrict my focus to events at the level of clinical 
practice so as to facilitate detailed study of the relationship between the individual and the cultural, 
and how these accountabilities are configurediii. I first explore how the inquiry format structures 
accounts and accountabilities, I then examine how ‘culture’ is constituted and made visible in the 
Kirkup Report.  In the final section, I discuss the new and old forms of accountability enacted by 
inquiry reports. 
My analysis is informed primarily by three overlapping schools of thought, all of which have made 
important contributions to my understanding of how capacities for action are configured amongst 
persons and things. Firstly, the call to study practices symmetrically that emerged early in actor-
network theory prompts an examination of how work gets done without presupposing who or what 
are the important actors. Agency is reconceptualised from an inherent capacity of individuals to a 
product of the relations between persons and things.  As Suchman (2009: 4) puts it, ‘human agency 
is always inextricably tied to the specific sociomaterial arrangements of which we are part’. 
Complementing this focus is the resonant concern within feminist studies of science and technology 
regarding who or what is and is not recognised in discourses of technoscientific practice.  Suchman 
(2009: 7) again explains that feminist orientations have elucidated the (often ignored) labours 
essential to ongoing sociotechnical assemblages and the capacities for action they enable.   
These lines of work have sensitised me to the invisible work that surrounds a dominant narrative. 
Invisibility stems from distinctions between foreground and background, action and embedding 
context, and is a point of contact with ethnomethodological studies of science and technology. 
Heath and Luff (2000) explain that in ethnomethodology the situation of action is far more 
significant than the notion of ‘context’; actions are essentially dependent for their meaning upon the 
context at hand, rather than being ‘influenced’ by a background context.  These preoccupations 
inform my desire to explore shifts in accountability, to see whether the inclusion of ‘culture’ works 
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towards a decentred form of accountability or whether in some way it consolidates traditional ideas 
about capacities for action. 
 
HOW INQUIRIES STRUCTURE ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Before examining the forms of accountability inquiries enact, I first explore how their knowledge-
making practices shape the forms of evidence on which inquiry panels adjudicate. The perceived 
independence and credibility of an inquiry is established in large part by the composition of the 
inquiry team.  They are often chaired by a legally qualified person, such as a judge, who is assisted by 
a panel of experts with relevant content knowledge (Walshe and Higgins, 2002; Elliott and 
McGuinness, 2002).  The merits of a strong legal framing have been noted as impartiality, skill in 
managing complex evidence (Elliott and McGuinness, 2002: 16), and the ability to conduct inquiries 
justly (Smith, 2000).  Dingwall (1986: 505), however, suggests the primary purpose for the use of 
lawyers is symbolic in that the law’s apparent independence of sectional interest serves to 
depoliticise the arising issues.  Furthermore, Walshe and Higgins (2002) point to the ‘subtle 
juridification’ this legal framing lends the process.  This finds expression in the way individuals are 
called upon to give testimony, cautioning them that their conduct may be questioned.  Dingwall 
further suggests that in this quasi-judicial model the protection legal processes offer can be missing, 
for example, by expecting higher than average standards of practice.  The authors of the Kirkup 
Report recognised, and attempted to ameliorate, potential juridification in order to engender a 
‘collaborative approach’; the interview protocol specifically noted that interviewees were not 
‘witnesses’ and did not ‘give evidence’ (p207), however, a collaborative approach may have been 
undermined by the routine confiscation of phones, tablets, and recording devices during the 
interviews. Further, there is some dispute over the legal powers inquiries hold.  Elliott and 
McGuinness (2002:15) stated that inquiries have ‘no clear legal status’, whereas Walshe and Higgins 
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(2002) claim that public inquiries (such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry)  
have wide statutory powers to gather evidence and require witnesses to appear.  The Morecambe 
Bay Investigation was not commissioned as a ‘public inquiry’ as this was not considered conducive to 
the privacy and tact the investigation required (2015:197). Thus, despite considerable insistence by 
the investigating team, there were still occasions when individuals refused to be interviewed. 
Demonstrating their editorial role, the panel note their disapproval in the report and even published 
one person’s refusal letter in the appendices. 
Regarding the inquiry’s terms of reference and panel of experts, Elliott and McGuinness (2002:16) 
suggest that these ‘may reflect the dominant paradigms regarding causality’ which, in the train crash 
and stadia disaster inquiries they studied, required the appointment of engineering professors who 
focused on explicit knowledge and technical issues to the neglect of ‘the social elements of the 
system’.  Likewise, in the Morecambe Bay investigation, Dr Bill Kirkup CBE was appointed as 
chairperson by the Secretary of State.  Dr Kirkup, a medical doctor (with prior experience of serving 
on inquiry panels), then appointed a panel of experts who, except for a professor of healthcare 
research and law, were all clinicians holding leadership roles in paediatrics, obstetrics, nursing and 
midwifery. ‘Evidence’ in healthcare inquiries usually takes the form of performance statistics (such 
as hospital episode statistics and mortality rates which are subject to expert statistical analysis), 
medical records and documents from organisations such as regulatory bodies, hospital trusts, and 
coroners.  The review of medical records involves a specific approach that combines technologies of 
assessment with the panel’s expertise.  In the Morecambe Bay inquiry, all the medical records of 
maternal deaths, stillbirths and neonatal deaths between January 2004-June 2013 (plus others 
where concerns about care had been raised), were reviewed by a clinical member of the panel to 
identify ‘notable factors’ using a validated tool designed by University of Leicester.  For those cases 
identified as warranting comprehensive review, this was followed by two clinical members of the 
panel assessing whether the (recorded) care met relevant benchmarks (16 sets of national 
guidelines).  In each case, care was graded according to a 4 point scale of suboptimal care where 0 
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meant no suboptimal care and 3 meant major suboptimal care, again using an assessment tool 
designed and validated by the University of Leicester.  Of interest are the definitions and judgements 
embedded within the grading scale.  Grade 1 is where there is evidence of suboptimal care but 
different management would have made no difference to the outcome, grade 2 is as grade 1 but in 
which different management might have made a difference to the outcome, and grade 3 is as above 
but where different management would reasonably be expected to have made a difference to the 
outcome.  Given the arguments presented earlier about the erasure of contexts and the 
strengthening of connection between action and outcome that occurs in documented accounts, one 
might surmise that a hindsight bias would be difficult to avoid. 
In addition to documented evidence, individual interviews are undertaken, recorded and 
transcribed.  While collating this evidence, considerable effort is made to conduct the inquiry 
transparently.  Hearings may be conducted in public or transcripts made publicly available and 
reports are published (Walshe and Higgins, 2002).  During the Morecambe Bay investigation, there 
were four 4 face-to-face meetings of the panel with affected families, the interview protocol was 
published as part of the report, and summaries of interviews published on the inquiry website.  In 
the report, verbatim quotes are attributed to named individuals, and a list of interviewees and their 
job titles appended.  Such public testimony makes for a particular kind of accountability.  In its 
favour, it promotes transparency, builds public confidence that the inquiry has been conducted 
conscientiously, and potentially allows for a sense of justice and redress.  However, it also 
individualises accounts, delineates one person’s role and actions from another’s, draws lines of 
responsibility between one person and another.  Furthermore, the inquiry team exercise total 
editorial control over how the transcripts are utilised in the final report – inclusions, exclusions, and 
contextualisations are at the command of the inquiry team.  Moreover, the attribution of accounts 
to named individuals can provoke already troubled working relationships, and the retribution 
whistleblowers can receive is well knowniv . Consequently, Walshe and Higgins (2002) point out that 
inquiries can contribute to the assignation of blame and mechanisms for retribution.   
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When it comes to interpreting the evidence, Brown (2003:104) argues that the evidence is organised 
to align with the prevailing understandings of how people and organisations behavev .  Indeed, a 
‘systems approach’ is often evident; this involves tracing the lineage of ‘mistakes’ through the 
organisation to uncover the circumstances that produced such opportunities for error.  As Dekker 
(2011: 33) points out, for more than 20 years the ‘context’ has been taken more seriously: 
We now regularly look for sources of trouble in the organizational, administrative, 
and regulatory layers of the system, not just the operational or engineered sharp-
end.  The shift from sharp-end failures and operator error to blunt end and 
organizational factors is certainly not complete, but at least legitimate today.  
Often, however, the influence of these sources is not explicitly noted; the Kirkup Report contains no 
references to published sources – social science, human factors or otherwise.  Despite this, in the 
summation of the report, a theory of ‘drift’ is employed to explain the disparity between practices at 
FGH and elsewhere.  Snook (2000:194) developed the concept of ‘practical drift’ to refer to ‘the 
slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure’.  This happens because of the 
necessity for ‘practical action’ when formalised rules do not match the situation at hand: 
When rules don’t match, pragmatic individuals adjust their behaviour accordingly; 
they act in ways that better align with their perceptions of current demands.  In 
short, they break the rules.  (Snook, 2000:193) 
Over time, because of constant demands for local efficiency, practice drifts away from documented 
procedures.  When these practices meet no resistance, they are reinforced and become 
institutionally accepted (Snook, 2000:194), and being passed on through processes of socialisation, 
drift continues largely unchecked.  However, it may be Dekker’s (2011) formulation of ‘drift into 
failure’ that is being employed.  Dekker, a human factors analyst, has perhaps more currency in 
healthcare literature.  Dekker (2011:14) describes ‘drift into failure’ as: 
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Local decisions that made sense at the time given the goal, knowledge and mindset 
of the decision-makers, can cumulatively become a set of organised circumstances 
that make the system more likely to produce a harmful outcome.  Locally sensible 
decisions about balancing safety and productivity – once made and successfully 
repeated – can eventually grow into unreflective, routine, taken-for-granted scripts 
that become part of the worldview that people all over the organisation or system 
bring to the decision problems.   
In this formulation, and alongside Snook, Dekker explicitly draws on the influential work of Turner 
(1978), Perrow (1984), and Vaughan (1996), who have respectively emphasised the man-made, 
normality, and cultural bases of organisational failure.  Dekker (2011: 39) further suggests that from 
the inside, drift is invisible: 
From the outside, such fine-tuning constitutes incremental experimentation in 
uncontrolled settings.  On the inside, incremental nonconformity is an adaptive 
response to scarce resources and production goals.  This means that departures from 
the norm become the norm.  Seen from inside people’s own work, deviations 
become compliant behaviour.   
‘Deviations’ as compliant behaviour is an insight most clearly articulated in Vaughan’s concept of the 
‘normalisation of deviance’.  She intricately traced the factors that combined to produce a cultural 
disposition among NASA engineers and managers towards the rationalisation of risk and the 
normalisation of deviant findings.  Vaughan (2016: 65) says: 
By “normalized”, I mean that behaviour the work group first identified as technical 
deviation was subsequently reinterpreted as within the norm for acceptable joint 
performance, then finally officially labeled (sic) an acceptable risk.  They defined 
evidence that deviated from an acceptable standard so that it became the standard. 
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… The work group brought their construction of risk and their method of responding 
to problems with the SRB joints to the next incident when signals of potential danger 
again challenged the prevailing construction of risk.  Risk had to be renegotiated.  The 
past – past problem definition, past method of responding to the problem – became 
part of the social context of decision making.    
By ‘normalization of deviance’ Vaughan does not mean that inappropriate behaviour gradually 
became more normal.  Rather, Vaughan is at pains to explain the conditions of uncertainty within 
which the engineers worked and how their ‘precise, objective, and rule-following’ practice conveyed 
an image at odds with this uncertainty.  Moreover, the idea that rule-following is inherently good 
and ‘drift’ inherently bad has been questioned.  Rowley (2011), for example, shows that sometimes 
interventions that aimed to secure safety jeopardise it (as in the case of inferior quality ‘single-use’ 
equipment designed to counter the risk of cross infection) and that safety can be achieved more 
effectively through innovative – but deviant – practices (as when re-usable items of emergency 
equipment that perform better than their single-use counterparts are used as single-use). Implicit 
though they may be, theories  about the causes of organisational failure make their way into 
inquiries and, in the Kirkup Report, find expression in the emphasis on culture and the utilisation of 
‘drift’ as a way of explaining  events.   
 
In summary, inquiry panels have wide discretionary powers to define the scope and nature of the 
problem.  The credibility and authority of the inquiry draws, in large part, from the prestige of the 
inquiry team, and the legal framing conveys independence and objectivity.  Evidence, which takes 
the form of statistics, documents, medical records and personal testimony, is structured towards 
individualisation of accounts and the allocation of personal responsibilities.  Evidence is selected, 
scrutinised and edited by the inquiry team, giving them considerable latitude to shape what is 
considered, how it is framed, and of course, to conclude on the matter.  This evidence is arranged 
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according to current understandings of organisational failure which have introduced the concept of 
‘culture’ into explanatory frameworks.  Transparency is achieved through making the evidence, the 
process, and the findings publicly available, but potentially comes at the cost of provoking troubled 
working relationships and exposing ‘whistleblowers’.  
 
MAKING ‘CULTURE’ VISIBLE  
 
Given that the structure of inquiries leans towards the individualising of accounts, ‘culture’ as a 
cause of healthcare failures presents a tension in how an individualising framework might 
accommodate collective responsibilities.  Demonstrating the priority ‘culture’ has attained, the 
Francis Report, positioned ‘culture’ as a cause and explanation of healthcare failures.  The inquiry 
found in existence: 
'a culture of fear in which staff did not feel able to report concerns; a culture of 
secrecy in which the trust board shut itself of from what was happening in its hospital 
and ignored its patients; and a culture of bullying, which prevented people from 
doing their jobs properly.' (p10) 
A culture of fear explains the non-reporting of incidents, a culture of secrecy explains the denial of 
appalling standards of care, and a culture of bullying explains why people didn’t do their jobs 
properly.  This positioning of culture as a cause and explanation of healthcare failures has become 
commonplace in contemporary discourses on patient safety, it posits cultural change as a lever for 
improvements and introduced a growing number of cultural assessment tools that aim to 
disaggregate and measure cultures (for an evaluation of such tools see Mannion et al, 2009).   
However, sociological work around patient safety has problematised the implicit conceptualisation 
of culture as something that can be known and manipulated in predictable ways.  Hillman et al 
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(2013), for example, illustrate how the implementation of a falls reduction target on elderly care 
wards unintentionally created cultures of restriction that undermined the independence and dignity 
of patients.  Davies and Mannion (2013) question the assumption that culture is somehow contained 
within a workplace.  They point out that Mid Staffordshire Trust was responding to a policy drive 
towards foundation status (giving Trusts more independence than standard NHS Trusts).  They 
therefore call for more sophisticated understandings of cultural dynamics and their relationship to 
healthcare policy (Davies and Mannion, 2013). 
Moreover, from the perspective of one schooled in STS (particularly an ANT-version of STS), the 
status of culture as an explanation is problematic for more fundamental reasons.  Law makes the 
argument in relation to ‘the social’, but the rationale applies equally to ‘the cultural’; he suggests 
that ‘the social’ is not pre-given but a product of a network or  system.  As such, it cannot serve as an 
explanation, but is itself in need of explanation:  
… any move to a system logic tends to undo social foundations as an explanatory 
resource. This is because it assumes that since systems have their own relational 
logic, the latter is likely to reshape the social just as much as the technical. And this in 
turn means that the social is unable to explain anything. Though it exists, it is just as 
much in need of explanation as the technical. (Law, 2008: 631-2)  
Latour (1984) had applied the same reasoning to ‘power’, repositioning it from something that 
explains differences of privilege to a consequence of social relations and thus something to be 
explained.  The message is that culture should not be viewed as a homogenous and stable entity that 
acts on others but something that is relational and evolving, that both informs and is informed by 
those relations, consequently, it is how particular cultures come into being that interests me.  The 
Kirkup report uses the term ‘culture’ sparingly, mostly when interviewees use the term.  However, it 
gives a strong sense of the culture of the unit by paying detailed attention to themes of repeated 
failures of knowledge and skills, sets of routinely substandard practices, persistently dysfunctional 
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working relationships between different staff groups, the geographical and professional isolation of 
the unit, and particularly for midwives, the role of professional ideology.  It is clear that when taken 
together, these are conceptualised as constitutive of the unit’s culture as the report states: ‘The 
Trust has made significant progress recently, but it is essential that this is maintained, and 
organisational culture is notoriously resistant to change’ (p185, my emphasis).  In effect, then, the 
Kirkup Report  provides a window on the constellation of elements that produced an organisational 
culture conducive to perilous failures in the care of pregnant and labouring women and their 
newborns, and it is this I would like to explore. 
The term ‘culture’ has a chequered past and its usage connotes different things at different times to 
different people (see Kuper (1999) for a history of how the term has been employed in 
anthropology).  However, for my purposes, Traweek’s (1992:437-38, original emphasis) explication is 
helpful: 
To anthropologists, ‘culture’ is not all about vestigial values, ‘society’ is not all bout 
agonistic encounters, and ‘self’ is not about autonomy and initiative.  A community is 
a group of people with a shared past, with ways of recognizing and displaying their 
differences from other groups, and expectations for a shared future.  Their culture is 
the ways, the strategies they recognize and use and invent for making sense, from 
common sense to disputes, from teaching to learning; it is also their ways of making 
things and making use of them and the ways they make over their world. 
Martin (1998: 36, my emphasis) likewise explains, ‘We are not looking for a thing; we are seeking to 
understand processes by which things, persons, concepts, and events become invested with 
meaning.’ I’m interested in how culture was made at the maternity unit of FGH, how practices and 
interactions came to take the shape that they did.  The Kirkup Report, however, gives me a particular 
view on this, one filtered through its authors.  Whilst Brown (2003:97) points out the value of inquiry 
reports for rendering visible ‘what are often latent aspects of organizations, sheds light on how 
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people make sense of complicated and problematic social situations, and how low-probability, high-
consequence events are dealt with’, Suchman (1995:63) reminds us that  
culture is always relational.  Rather than describing attributes of a population from 
some neutral position outside the field of view, accounts of cultural meanings and 
practices are inevitably created from particular standpoints that set up the lines of 
comparison and contrast between the speaker/writer and the persons and practices 
described.   
Like ethnographers, the authors of the Kirkup Report are writing culture, a process that enfolds both 
authors and subjects.  Therefore, rather than taking the report as a ‘true’ description of the culture 
and events at FGH, I examine how culture is configured and made visible in the Kirkup Report, a 
process that elucidates both the perspectives of the authors and the practices of the healthcare 
workers at FGH.  I examine to what effect culture is made visible, specifically, if and how it reshapes 
accountabilities.  
As mentioned above, the Kirkup Report gives detailed attention to clinicians’ substandard 
knowledge, skills and practices, persistently dysfunctional working relationships between different 
staff groups, the role of professional ideology, and the geographical and professional isolation of the 
unit.  It is to these themes I now turn. 
Dysfunctional working relationships  
Early in the report, lines of division are drawn in the working relationships between the different 
professional groupings:  
We found that none of these groups [midwives, obstetricians and paediatricians] 
were able to work effectively together, with repeated instances of failure to 
communicate important clinical information about individual patients.  We were told 
that there was a “them and us” culture in the unit. (p13) 
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 A language of ‘them and us’ has elsewhere been noted to characterise interactions between 
midwives and obstetricians (Foley and Faircloth, 2003: 173), here, however, the insularity of 
professional groupings produces a problematic lack of communication: 
The obstetricians have poor working relations with the paediatricians and the 
paediatricians do not have good relations with each other.  More than one 
paediatrician described the paediatric consultants as “a dysfunctional team”.  The 
relationship between the obstetricians and the midwives is, we believe, more subtle 
and is reflected in their clinical practice, with evidence that the midwives sought to 
avoid involvement of the obstetricians in the care of their patients, while the 
obstetricians remained content to wait to be called (and sometimes then to be 
dismissed again as no longer needed).  (p64) 
The report gives examples of how poor clinical knowledge was exacerbated by the reluctance to 
collaborate; obstetricians delivered babies of high-risk mothers in the unit (rather than transfer 
them before birth to better equipped clinical settings) against the advice of the paediatricians.  
Paediatricians, however, were also unwilling to transfer babies to other clinical settings;  they 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach with babies likely to need neonatal intensive care, missing the 
optimal time for transfer and necessitating difficult emergency transfers.  The relationship depicted 
between the midwives and the obstetricians is one of disengagement; obstetricians are cast as 
complacent, content to be excluded, and midwives are portrayed as fiercely protective of their 
‘normal childbirth’ boundaries.  The report documents how midwives took exclusive control of the 
risk assessment process for pregnant women and, often without discussion with the obstetricians, 
repeatedly misclassified women as ‘low risk’ and therefore to be cared for by midwives alone. 
That professional boundaries play a role in securing or threatening patient safety is not news.  
Indeed, Dixon-Woods (2010:16) identified safety as a ‘site of organizational and professional politics’ 
and highlighted how junior staff can struggle to draw attention to problems, and equally, how those 
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of parallel standing could refuse to defer to colleagues, both situations that incurred negative 
consequences.  However, what is interesting about the situation at FGH is the insight if offers as to 
how professional ideology plays into professional politics and boundaries.  
Professional ideology 
The role of the midwife is to support women in pregnancy and childbirth irrespective of the level of 
intervention they require.  However, in the UK, if pregnancy and childbirth are deemed to be 
‘normal’, midwives can legally provide total care without involving obstetricians (Gould, 2000)vi.  
Nevertheless, the rate of medical intervention in ostensibly ‘low-risk’ births has been a longstanding 
concern within midwifery and obstetrics (Johanson et al, 2002) and for the previous 12 years the 
Royal College of Midwives’ campaigned for ‘normal birth’ indicating its  importance as a site for 
political action.  The characterisation of ‘normal’ from ‘high risk’ births is both a routine, but deeply 
political, part of midwifery work that defines the scope of autonomous practice and secures, within 
its boundaries, the authority of midwifery knowledge.  ‘Normal’ or ‘natural’ (the terms are used 
synonymously in the report) childbirth is thus a concept central to midwives’ occupational identity 
and legitimates their autonomy of work (Foley and Faircloth, 2003:183).  At FGH, however, the 
enthusiasm with which women were categorised as ‘normal’ and thus eligible for midwifery-led care 
received particular criticism:  
midwifery care in the unit became strongly influenced by a small number of 
dominant individuals whose over-zealous pursuit of the natural childbirth approach 
led at times to inappropriate and unsafe care. (p13-14) 
In other circumstances enthusiasm for a philosophy of ‘normal birth’ and the valuing of low 
intervention rates has been associated with reducing ‘unwarranted’ intervention and lowering 
Caesarean Section rates (Johanson et al, 2002).  To an STS audience, the problematic status of 
‘normal’ and ‘natural’ – its slippery and value-laden character – is well understood (for example, see 
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van Hilvoorde et al (2007) for a discussion of the natural and the artificial in elite sport).  Moreover, 
Vaughan elucidates how the need to balance competing risks can work to support the dominant 
ideology of practice.  She explains how the concept of ‘acceptable risk’ was utilised by NASA 
engineers and managers to amend the design of the spacecraft rather than redesign thus  affirming 
the dominant ideology of the engineers: a belief in technological redundancy.  The Kirkup Report, 
however, is silent on the competing risks involved in the risk assessment process and it portrays the 
actions of the midwives as a classic example of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn, 1993: 784) in which 
distinctions are made between the practices of one group and another for professional gain.  Gieryn 
(1993: 792) argues that boundary work is likely to be employed in circumstances ‘when the goal is 
protection of autonomy over professional activities’.  Accordingly:    
We also heard distressing accounts of middle-grade obstetricians being strongly 
discouraged from intervening (or even assessing patients) when it was clear that 
problems had developed in labour that required obstetric care.  We heard that some 
midwives would “keep other people away, ‘well we don’t need to tell the doctors, we 
don’t need to tell our colleagues, we don’t need to tell anybody else that this woman 
is in the unit, because she’s normal’. (p14) 
Portrayed in this way, the midwives are cast as vehemently resistant to obstetric input, and wilfully 
courting risk.  Following Vaughan (p133), however, it is possible to see the midwives actions as one 
of conformity; the midwives actions could be understood as attempts to uphold their professional 
philosophy of promoting ‘natural’ childbirth.     
Moreover, the authors of the Kirkup Report  figure culture as a pernicious vector for the ‘spreading’ 
and location for the ‘embedding’ of erroneous practices: ‘these incorrect and damaging practices 
spread to other midwives in the unit, probably quite widely’ (p14) and ‘this deeply flawed approach 
became more widespread and embedded in the practice of the unit (p64)’.  The excerpt below 
describes how an insular culture perpetuated events. 
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Based on what we heard, we believe that staff reinforced each other’s view that the 
care they were providing was acceptable, not sub-optimal.  The midwifery staff were 
already a close-knit group (we heard that off-duty midwives would drop into the unit 
just to chat), and it is clear that in response to this perceived external threat they 
developed a ‘one for all’ approach, and in fact described themselves as “the 
musketeers” [reference to email correspondence between 2 named midwives].  
(p17-18) 
Here then, it is suggested that the midwives closed ranks when their autonomy appeared to be 
threatened.  The ‘musketeers’ label, emblematic of the protective, uncritical predisposition that 
characterised professional self-regulation until recently, readily lends itself to scandalising the public 
and thus dominated press coverage of the inquiry.   
Geographical and professional isolation  
The report conveys the culture of the midwifery unit as one strongly influenced by the ideology of 
‘normal childbirth’ which functions to provide freedom from scrutiny, it is a culture that is exclusive, 
protective and almost sealed off from outsiders.  In building this picture, the report is focused 
largely, but not exclusively, on humans; care is taken to outline how organisational structures and 
geographical location contributed to the problematic culture of the unit and its management.  It is 
noted how repeated service reconfigurations distanced the unit from its higher level managers and, 
below, how the geography of the region contributes to the insular culture: 
Barrow-in-Furness is a relatively inaccessible town comprising a pocket of post-
industrial deprivation on the edge of an area of scattered, rural, more affluent 
communities.  Many of the non-medical staff were born and raised in the town, 
trained in the hospital and have worked there ever since.  Medical staff have proved 
hard to recruit and there has been little opportunity for joint working or shared 
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experience with other sites.  All of this has contributed to the isolation of the hospital 
and its clinical practice.  In such settings, practice can ‘drift’ away from the standards 
and procedures found elsewhere, and this can remain undetected until it has 
deviated a long way and obvious problems develop.  In the maternity services at FGH, 
this ‘drift’ involved a particularly dangerous combination of declining skills and 
knowledge, a drive to achieve normal childbirth ‘whatever the cost’ and a reckless 
approach to detecting and managing mothers and babies at higher risk. (p183) 
Loosely employing a metaphor of ‘drift’, one gets a sense of cultural detachment that distances staff 
and practices from reference points (standards and guidelines, or how practice happens elsewhere) 
and the internal affirmation of the sufficiency of care discourages ownership and responsibility for 
adverse outcomes when they occurred.  
 
NEW AND OLD ENACTMENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
As Suchman (1995: 63) observes, ‘Things are made visible so that they can be seen, talked about, 
and potentially, manipulated’ and in the Kirkup Report culture is depicted so that its effects might be 
known and in some ways addressed.  However, culture is not an independent thing to be held 
accountable, but something constituted by practices, shared ways of working, patterned 
interactions, and materialised in overstretched managerial structures.  These are collective, 
distributed and non-human forms that conventional frameworks of accountability struggle to 
accommodate.  Next, therefore, I consider the forms of accountability enacted in the Kirkup Report 
and the continuities and discontinuities with conventional forms of accountability. 
i) Individual and decontextualised 
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The Kirkup Report goes to some length to untangle the events, relationships, and circumstances 
seen to contribute to the problems at FGH.  Yet, in the final analysis, a conventional and 
individualised form of accountability takes priority:   
The prime responsibility for ensuring the safety of clinical services rests with the 
clinicians who provide them, and those associated with the unit failed to discharge 
this duty over a prolonged period.  (p183) 
By the end of 2008, it states, the problems ‘must have been obvious to experienced staff within the 
maternity unit’ but that ‘the response remained shaped by the dysfunctional nature of the unit’ 
(p16), treating incidents superficially and as isolated events and with defensive, inadequate 
investigations.  One specific midwife, the maternity risk manager (named in the report), is 
highlighted for the distinct role she played:   
we believe that she was part of the close-knit midwifery group of ‘musketeers’ and, 
as a former Royal College of Midwives union official had continued to act in a staff 
representative role supporting individual midwives.  She was central to deciding 
whether and how incidents would be investigated, often by herself. (p17-18) 
Here, collective cultural responsibilities are backgrounded and at the foreground is one particular 
midwife and an individualised form of accountability.  Her approach to the investigation of safety 
incidents was characterised as inadequate, overprotective, and seen to feed the midwives’ 
perception that they were being unfairly criticised.  In response to a series of ‘difficult questions’ the 
Trust solicitor had compiled, the  maternity risk manager is reported to have prepared and circulated 
a set of ‘model answers’, a response the panel identify as ‘clearly wrong’ (p19).   Moreover, a 
compelling account of the wrong-doing of the midwives involved, and particularly the maternity risk 
manager, is constructed by noting the unexplained disappearance of key clinical records and 
detailing how one line of defence, that a neonate was not hypothermic, changed in the face of 
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incontrovertible evidence to a defence of ignorance, by all midwives involved, as to the significance 
of a low temperature in a neonate (a cardinal sign of infection that should trigger medical review). 
At this point all contextualisation is absent and, as Vaughan (2016: 70) states, ‘Robbed of the social 
and cultural context that gave them meaning, many [actions] became hard to understand, 
controversial, and, in some cases, incriminating’. Whilst it might not mitigate the circulation of 
model answers, one could note that the maternity risk manager had been working within a model of 
professional regulation that, for the most part, operated ‘behind closed doors’ where informal and 
quasi-formal mechanisms of self-regulation and non-criticism had long reigned (Rosenthal, 1995), 
and its collusive, protective nature had been for a long time, if not condoned, at least accepted.  In 
this sense, light touch, internal, and informal mechanisms of self-regulation were entirely in keeping 
with the prevailing norm.  
She is not alone, however, in being attributed personal responsibility as the clinical director of the 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology unit also receives severe criticism.  The report notes how ‘it was difficult 
to identify evidence of strong and decisive leadership’ (p59). Moreover, he faced sharp questioning 
at interview:  
“You are a clinical director yet you don’t ask questions of your consultants.  You don’t 
ask questions of the head of midwifery, even though you’re accountable for the 
quality of the care in the Unit.  You push things up to the chief executive and you 
don’t follow up when things don’t happen.  I don’t get what your professional role is 
as clinical director.  Everything seems to flow through you.  I don’t understand what 
you do.” 
His response was 
“Tell me, what do you expect more?  If you have concern, you express your concern 
to your superiors.  What more can you do?” (p59-60) 
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This is one of the few occasions in the report when the interviewers are quoted verbatim.  In doing 
so,  the authors convey how hard they pressed the Clinical Director to account for his inadequate 
leadership and highlight his striking denial of responsibility.   
Although individualised forms of accountability are conventional, when individuals are held 
accountable for collective norms and practices the outcome, rightly or wrongly, is resentment: 
…the strong view amongst staff that they were being unfairly criticised on occasions 
became overt hostility to those challenging this view.  This underlying feeling was 
evident at times from the approach taken by interviewees in responding to our 
questions, and was sometimes apparent in email correspondence.  The most notable 
example is an email from one midwife to another concerning a Nursing and 
Midwifery Council (NMC) investigation that was entitled ‘NMC Shit’ [the names of the 
midwives and date of the email are footnoted in the report].  (p18) 
In an environment adrift from contemporary working practices, wherein substandard care had been 
normalised, and believing that upholding the normality of birth equates to  fulfilling professional 
obligations, then being singled out and penalised for collective values and practices feels unjust and 
invokes responses of denial and resistance.  Sagan (1993) comments that human errors and 
organisational failures are political events for which credit and blame must be assigned and such 
allocations often serve to protect the interests of the most powerful, therefore, finding ‘operator 
error’ a cause is more likely in hierarchical and tradition-bound organisations.  Moreover, the 
‘naming and shaming’ exemplified in the report’s structure (of attributing documentary evidence 
and quotations to named individuals), the verbatim quotes of sharp questioning and resistance to 
criticism is, as Greer and McLaughlin (2012: 289) observe, a form of ‘ritual public punishment and 
humiliation’. 
ii) Individual yet contextualised 
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Despite embracing the individualised accountability stripped of context as above, sometimes there is 
a careful noting of circumstances that have shaped, and perhaps mitigate, an individual’s role.  This 
form of accountability is an attenuated version of the conventional individualised form seen above.  
Here, in contrast to the Clinical Director of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the Clinical Director of 
Paediatrics’ efforts to change practice are described in detail; he wanted to spend a day/week 
working with the FGH consultants, joining them on their ward rounds.  However, this intervention 
was perceived as intimidating and resulted in written complaints about the clinical director’s 
‘bullying and intrusive management style’ and management training for  the Clinical Director .  As 
Prasad (2007:545) points out, ‘articulation of agency occurs in a particular way in order to 
strengthen a claim’.  In the report, the paediatrician’s attempts to change practices and the 
constraints he met are recovered, strengthening the impression of this individual as one who takes 
responsibility, recognises problems and acts accordingly, even in the face of widespread inertia. The 
panel’s more sympathetic treatment is perhaps evoked by the paediatrician’s insight and readiness 
to share responsibility: 
He said that he believed there are issues at all levels, and made the point that if there 
are many reasons for the quality of services to be poor, no one individual feels 
responsible…  In relation to the clinical incidents, the clinical director felt that the 
midwives became disproportionately the focus of attention, and that the paediatric 
team, himself included, was overlooked and bypassed.  He also believed that the 
obstetricians were less in focus than they should have been (p60) 
The paediatrician frames events in terms of ‘a problem of many hands’: ‘a problem that arises in 
contexts where multiple actors – organisations, individuals, groups – each contribute to effects seen 
at system level, but it remains difficult to hold any single actor responsible for these effects’ (Dixon-
Woods and Pronovost,  2016: 485).  In this sense, as Tombs and Whyte (2007) have argued, systems 
that seek to individualise blame and responsibility can obstruct proper redress rather than assist it, 
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and indeed, the paediatrician also makes this point, suggesting that level of blame attributed to the 
midwives was disproportionate and that the role of obstetric and paediatric consultants deserved 
wider recognition.   The scandalising ‘musketeers’ label made the midwives an easy target and 
perhaps deflected attention from the obstetric and paediatric consultants, or perhaps it is another 
manifestation of the hierarchical and gendered working relations in healthcare, along which lines 
culpability for failures is distributed accordingly.  
iii) Collective (human) 
So although named individuals are singled out for attention, the type of attention they receive is 
carefully differentiated.  Some individuals, it seems, were felt to be more culpable than others.  
However, there are also attempts to introduce a collective form of accountability, particularly in 
repeatedly highlighting the lack of awareness and questioning of a dysfunctional culture:  
It is evident that none of these manifestations of poor working relations are in the 
best interest of patients, but there is a lack of awareness among staff of their 
responsibility to help solve these problems. (p64) 
Throughout the report, the lack of challenge is frequently noted conveying a sense in which 
everyone is implicated in the complacency seen to sustain the problems for so long.  Nevertheless, 
the ease with which one might raise a challenge is not shared equally amongst practitioners, as 
Martin and colleagues note (2015: 635), ‘the capacity to respond is itself unevenly distributed and 
enmeshed within complex configurations and logics of power.’  Accordingly, the authors of the 
Kirkup Report focus particular attention on the obstetricians:   
Obstetricians working in the unit were well-placed to observe these lapses from 
proper standards, and it is clear that they did, but seemingly lacked the 
determination to challenge these practices. (p14)   
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According to the Kirkup Report, obstetricians observed these practices and understood the risks they 
held.  They were in a position, practically and authoritatively, to act but failed to do so. 
Accountability is shared across the obstetric consultants yet their lack of action is decontextualised.  
Aveling and colleagues (2016:228) observed that when problems become so naturalised they are 
either invisible or considered inescapable, this has ‘the effect of depressing aspirations and 
normalising low expectations for quality of care, so that opportunities to improve care even when it 
was possible to do so were neglected.’  If the primary purpose of inquiries is to ‘learn lessons’, then 
the effects of normalising low expectations would be worth noting.  .  
Below, the lack of challenge is again noted, though the implication here is not one of complacency 
but lack of understanding: 
… A third [interviewee] told us that there were “a couple of senior people who 
believed that in all sincerity they were processing the agenda as dictated at the 
time… to uphold normality… there’ve been one or two influential figures who’ve 
perpetrated that sort of approach and there’s nobody challenging…”’ (p13-14) 
This comment goes some way to explaining the midwives’ resistance to blame to which the authors 
of the Kirkup Report took such exception.  The attribution of blame feels unjust, not just because 
individuals are held accountable for collective action, but because through their cultural lens, their 
actions were not wrong, they were ‘normal’.  They were doing what, as midwives, they were 
charged to do – uphold the normality of birth. As Aveling et al (2016: 223) put it, ‘The deeply 
ingrained nature of guiding norms meant that some actions and omissions were not readily visible to 
some staff as violations of standards for which they should have to account.’  
To address the dysfunctional working relationships between the different groups of practitioners, 
the Kirkup Report specified certain measures which allow for ‘guiding norms’ to be exposed to a 
wider audience and cast in a different light.  The Trust should: 
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promote effective multidisciplinary team-working, in particular between 
paediatricians, obstetricians, midwives and neonatal staff.  These measures should 
include, but not be limited to, joint training sessions, clinical, policy and management 
meetings and staff development activities.  Attendance at designated events must be 
compulsory within the terms of employment. (p185) 
Although mandatory cooperation is something of an oxymoron, this measure does at least attempt 
to make porous the boundaries between different professional groups and stress the overlap 
between paediatric, obstetric, midwifery and neonatal practices.  
iv)  Collective (non-human) 
Debates around non-human agencies have developed understanding about its specificities and 
relationality,– in that agency need not be characterised by intentionality, that unconscious or inert 
things can contribute to the shaping of events as much as intentional human actors, and that 
‘actions’ are not bounded, discrete entities, they occur in relations (see Goodwin, 2008).  Likewise, 
then, a deeper understanding of how non-humans can be incorporated in collective forms of 
accountability is required.  Non-human elements cannot be held accountable as humans are, as they 
do not act in the same way.  In the Kirkup Report, making culture accountable meant tracing 
relationships, making visible their shaping of events, following the threads that connect practices to 
professional ideologies, elucidating how a remote geographical location can contribute to sets of 
practices detached from national standards.  Acknowledging this remoteness, the Kirkup Report 
insists staff at FGH connect with national standards of practice, possibly necessitating periods of 
practice elsewhere.  The Trust should: 
review the skills, knowledge, competencies and professional duties of care of all 
obstetric, paediatric, midwifery and neonatal nursing staff, and other staff caring for 
critically ill patients in anaesthetics and intensive and high dependency care, against 
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all relevant guidance from professional and regulatory bodies … and identify 
requirements for additional training, development and, where necessary, a period of 
experience elsewhere. (p185) 
These measures aim to re-establish connections with wider reference points – professional guidance 
and standards of practice as they are interpreted and enacted elsewhere.  Relations, then, are to be 
forged in ways that aim to ameliorate the remoteness of the geographical location.  Henke 
(2007:136) highlights the need to understand the ecology of built environments as this  illuminates 
‘a specific history of growth and improvisation in response to structural constraints’ and ‘helps us to 
see the full complexity of risky places’.  Illustrating Henke’s point, the authors of the Kirkup Report 
attend to the role played by the built environment in facilitating multidisciplinary teamwork.  The 
Trust: 
should identify options, with a view to implementation as soon as practicable, to 
improve the physical environment of the delivery suite at Furness General Hospital, 
including particularly access to operating theatres, an improved ability to observe 
and respond to all women in labour (p187) 
Here, the proposed adaptations embed a set of responsibilities into the built environment.  By 
permitting knowledgeable observers – midwives and obstetricians – particular views on activity, the 
built environment confers a responsibility on the viewer to act or intervene, should the situation 
require it.  So in a network of relations where practitioners are as skilled and knowledgeable as they 
ought to be, and where their practice can be observed, the built environment would work against 
the kind of complacency of being excluded discussed above. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: THE REMAKING OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN INQUIRY REPORTS  
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I have proposed that inquiries are a sociotechnology of accountability that is gaining in prominence. 
It does not replace regulation by professional bodiesvii, but it does augment the existing moral, legal 
and professional ways in which a practitioner’s actions may be scrutinised and held to account.  
Inquiries are different to pre-existing forms of accountability in many ways but, in particular, it is 
worth noting that they cut across professional boundaries, a factor that disposes them well to 
examine the connectedness of actions and relations between actors.  Additionally, Greer and 
McLaughlin, (2016: 15) note the likelihood for inquiries to ‘connect individual scandalous 
transgressions with systemic institutional failings’.  Therefore, we have a sociotechnology of 
accountability that, although it is constructed in such a way as to lean towards conventional, 
individual forms of accountability, current understanding of organisational failure as well as the 
breadth of the inquiry allow for the visibility of interprofessional relations and predispose the inquiry 
to look at organisational and collective factors.  These features go some way to explaining the 
proliferation of forms of accountability enacted in the Kirkup Report and place inquiries squarely at 
the heart of the individual-collective tension in accountability.  In respect of this tension, Goodwin 
(2014:57) has argued that what is needed is ‘a model of accountability that can address relations 
rather than individuals’ as in current forms of professional regulation ‘the distributedness of 
decisions, and the dependencies of collaborative work, escape recognition’.  To a degree, the use of 
culture in the Kirkup Report works towards this aim. The report makes culture visible through 
depicting routine practices and patterned interactions, through attending to how the remote 
location and the built environment of the hospital contributes to the way practice develops (or 
‘drifts’) over time. Yet, despite frequently aired concerns about the potential for collective forms of 
accountability to diminish individual accountability (see for example Wachter and Pronovost, 2009, 
and subsequent debate), this is one thing utilising culture in the Kirkup Report has not done.  
Collective forms of accountability are not replacing individual ones, rather forms of accountability 
are proliferating, and inquiries are thus extending existing technologies of accountability. 
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What does it do then, to make culture visible?  It casts light on how the depicted relations between 
practitioners are informed by the politics of organisations, (such as midwifery professional bodies 
that valorise ‘natural birth’), how this plays into the politics of work within an organisation such as 
FGH, and the effects this can have on safety.  Since the publication of the Kirkup Report, the Royal 
College of Midwives have ended their campaign for ‘normal birth’.  Some commentators deny this is 
a response to events at FGH and subsequent inquiry, positioning it as a general progression of the 
campaign in response to a changing social and cultural environment (Hundley and Teijlingen, 2017).  
However, the focus the Kirkup Report placed on the negative consequences zealous pursuit of 
professional ideology can hold is unprecedented and was widely reported in the news media.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to surmise that the Kirkup Report made a significant contribution to the 
‘changing social and cultural environment’.  
I also scrutinised the format of the inquiry and how this structures accounts and allows particular 
views on events to emerge.  At each point in its construction, details, contexts, and perspectives are 
introduced and filtered out.  The report is compelling, yet I have tried to resist being swept along by 
the authority of the report and its narratives of culpability and instead remain alert to the authorship 
practices of the investigating team, in particular   where contexts are included and where they are 
absent, for it is in these contextualisations that accountabilities are conferred and mitigated, and 
where culture is constituted and made visible.   
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i Healthcare in the UK is primarily delivered via the ‘National Health Service’ (NHS).  The NHS was established in 
1948 on the principles of providing universal coverage, financed through general taxation and therefore free at 
the point of use.  These principles persist although in a more diluted form.  Some people choose to 
supplement this provision with private healthcare and there have been considerable attempts to introduce 
market forces into the structure and financing arrangements of hospitals and general practice, most notably by 
successive conservative governments in the 1980s.  Therefore, the UK has a state-owned system of healthcare 
which co-exists with private insurance schemes and privately owned profit-making hospitals and clinics.  
Doctors enjoy considerable autonomy and commonly work within the NHS and privately (Bradby,2009).  These 
changes to the organisation of the NHS, along with broader moves to increase the transparency and 
accountability of medical decision making, have resulted in a complex and non-uniform landscape of medical 
practice, authority and autonomy.  Consequently, Dopson (2009:50) argues that despite all the organisational 
changes, ‘The evidence does not support the idea of the medical profession losing power  (indeed medical 
power remains strong and influential in healthcare delivery) and managers gaining it, but suggests a more 
complex picture with some professionals gaining, others losing ground and others adapting and taking on 
managerial responsibilities.’ 
ii An NHS Trust is an organisation within the NHS serving either a geographical area or specialist function (eg 
ambulance service).  In the context of this article, ‘Trusts’ refer to a number of hospitals, serving a particular 
geographical area, governed by one executive board.  The Board has oversight of financial and governance 
arrangements. 
iii Investigation of the governance arrangements of the Trust Board and overseeing bodies such as Monitor 
makes up a significant proportion of the report and, particularly the activities of the Trust Board in their 
response to incidents, are connected to events at the level of clinical practice.  However, it is impossible to 
explore the response of the Trust Board and wider governance arrangements and activities at the level of 
clinical practice to a satisfactory depth in one article.   Governance arrangements of the Trust Board will 
therefore be explored in a separate publication. 
iv Stephen Bolsin, for example, the consultant anaesthetist and whistleblower on the failings in paediatric heart 
surgery at Bristol (which led to the Kennedy inquiry that vindicated his concerns) was unable to find another 
position in the UK and moved to Australia to continue his career (BMJ, 2016). 
v Brown(2003) also points out the circularity involved, in that much of our understanding of organisational 
failure has been culled from analyses of inquiry reports. 
vi The circumstances in which a woman should be transferred to obstetric-led care are now laid down in a NICE 
guideline (Intrapartum care for healthy women and babies, Clinical guideline [CG190]: December 2014).  This 
updated a 2007 guideline which is no longer available but judging by the dating of new advice in the 2014 
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version it would appear as if these circumstances were not specified in previous versions.  See table 5 in Gould 
(2000) for the characteristics considered constitutive of ‘normal’ birth prior to NICE guidance. 
vii Seven midwives have been through disciplinary procedures, two of whom have been struck off the NMC 
register, and another suspended (BBC News, 2017). 
